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THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF PERSONAL INFORMATION IN AUSTRALIAN PRIVACY 
LAW 
 
Mark Burdon and Paul Telford∗
Australian privacy law regulates how government agencies and private sector organisations 
collect, store and use personal information. A coherent conceptual basis of personal 
information is an integral requirement of information privacy law as it determines what 
information is regulated. A 2004 report conducted on behalf of the UK’s Information 
Commissioner (the “Booth Report”) concluded that there was no coherent definition of 
personal information currently in operation because different data protection authorities 
throughout the world conceived the concept of personal information in different ways. The 
authors adopt the models developed by the Booth Report to examine the conceptual basis of 
statutory definitions of personal information in Australian privacy laws. Research findings 
indicate that the definition of personal information is not construed uniformly in Australian 
privacy laws and that different definitions rely upon different classifications of personal 
information. A similar situation is evident in a review of relevant case law. Despite this, the 
authors conclude the article by asserting that a greater jurisprudential discourse is required 
based on a coherent conceptual framework to ensure the consistent development of Australian 
privacy law. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Defining privacy has been a source of perennial angst for both legal academics1 and 
legislators.2 Legislative efforts to identify and regulate privacy issues have generally focused 
on the more manageable concerns that arise from the collection, storage and use of personal 
information.3 Therefore it is common that information privacy laws concentrate on the 
governance of personal information such that definitions of personal information are central 
to the application of most privacy laws, including Australian privacy laws.4
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 Accordingly, 
what is and what is not personal information is of crucial importance, as it will determine 
1 See R C Post, 'Three Concepts of Privacy' (2001) 89(6) Georgetown Law Journal 2087, 2087 where Post 
comments that the notion of privacy is so complex that it cannot be usefully conceptualised because it is so 
entangled with competing and contradictory dimensions; see also A L Allen, 'Coercing Privacy' (1999) 40(3) 
William and Mary Law Review 723, 745, Allen sees privacy as an inalienable right that should be considered as 
a pre-conditional foundation of a liberal egalitarian society; contra W M Beaney, 'The Right to Privacy and 
American Law' (1966) 3(2) Law and Contemporary Problems 253, 255, where Beaney doubts whether it is 
possible to define a “right of privacy.” 
2 To the extent that most privacy laws do not attempt to define privacy. For example, following the 
recommendations of the Australian Law Reform Commission, Privacy and Personal Information (1980) and the 
‘Younger Report’, K R H Younger, Report of the Committee on Privacy (1972), the original drafters of the 
Privacy Act (Cth) concluded that a rigid definition of privacy was not possible and that “it is a notion about 
whose precise boundaries there will always be a variety of opinions.” 
3 See for example P M Schwartz, 'Internet Privacy and the State' (2000) 32(3) Conneticut Law Review 815, 820 
“the leading paradigm on the Internet and in the real, or, offline world, conceives of privacy as a personal right to 
control the use of one's data.” 
4 See Australian Law Reform Commission, Privacy (ALRC 22), Vol. 2, 78, 1983. “In the context of personal 
information, the individual’s claim to privacy is therefore a claim to control, to an appropriate extent, the way 
that others in the community perceive him. The way that personal information about individuals is collected, 
used and disclosed is a matter of privacy concern.” 
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whether statutory redress is available. Despite that, little attention has been focused on what 
information constitutes personal information.  
 
A review of Australian privacy laws reveals that different definitions of personal information 
are currently in operation. However, whilst different definitions exist, all Australian privacy 
laws use the concept of personal information to assign rights of control to individuals and 
consign limiting obligations on data collecting organisations. The degree to which that 
regulation occurs depends upon how information is construed as personal information, and in 
particular, the extent to which the social complexity of personal information production is 
acknowledged. A context based analysis of personal information has been integral to the 
application of Australian privacy laws but different laws, through their definition of personal 
information, emphasise differing perspectives about the purpose of context based 
assessments.  
 
Section II of this paper details legislative and academic attempts to address the issue of what 
is personal information. Section III specifies the key elements of a 2004 report (the “Booth 
Report”) conducted for the UK’s Information Commissioner which examined the underlying 
basis of personal information in different jurisdictions. Section IV details definitions of 
personal information in Australian privacy laws and culminates with a brief review of 
recommendations put forward by the ALRC. Section V attempts to identify the conceptual 
basis of personal information in Australian law by examining legislative provisions in light of 
four models developed by the authors of the Booth Report. Section VI examines relevant case 
law and stresses that a greater jurisprudential discourse is required based on a sound 
conceptual footing. Finally, in Section VII the authors conclude the article. 
 
2. What is Personal Information? 
The notion of personal information is central to the effective functioning of information 
privacy laws. Like most forms of privacy regulation, definitions of personal information are 
inherently linked to fears arising from the advent of new technologies, particularly regarding 
the automated collection of information in computerised systems.5 These fears became 
realisable towards the end of the 1960s and legislative privacy responses focused on the 
narrower concept of information privacy or data protection.6
 
 The genesis of information 
privacy laws throughout the world derives principally from three defining documents that 
were drafted in the decade between the early 1970’s and the early 1980’s.  
In 1973, the US Department of Health, Education and Welfare produced a report entitled 
Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens.7 The Report’s recommendations led to the 
enactment of legislation and established a Code of Fair Information Practice for automated 
database systems that housed personal information. The Code provided the foundation for the 
Privacy Act 1974 (US) and laid the way for a series of reports that culminated in the Fair 
Information Practice Principles.8 In 1981, the Council of Europe adopted the 
                                                     
5 See e.g. K R H Younger, Report of the Committee on Privacy (1972), 177; Education & Welfare Advisory 
Committee to the Secretary of Health, Records Computers and the Rights of Citizens (1973)    
Convention for 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/DATACNCL/1973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm    
6 See A F Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967), 7 the conceptual starting point for information privacy laws in 
which Westin defined privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves 
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.”  
7 Education & Welfare Advisory Committee to the Secretary of Health, Records Computers and the Rights of 
Citizens (1973)    http://aspe.hhs.gov/DATACNCL/1973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm.    
8 Solove, DJ, Rotenberg, M and Schwartz, PM, Information Privacy Law (2nd ed, 2006). 
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the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data9 which 
was intended as a catalyst to encourage and guide state legislative initiatives rather than to 
provide a readily implementable set of data protection rules and regulations.10 Finally, the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was also instrumental in 
developing guidelines that had a significant impact as a foundation for national legislation, 
including Australia.11 The OECD’s Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data12
 
 was developed by a group of government experts under the 
chairmanship of the Hon. Mr. Justice Michael Kirby, who was then Chairman of the 
Australian Law Reform Commission. 
These three documents enshrined the notion that information privacy should be based on fair 
information practices and provide individuals with a degree of control about how 
organisations collect, store and use their personal information.13 However, despite legislative 
attempts to focus regulation on information privacy, law reformers, academics, regulatory and 
judicial entities have nevertheless developed alternative methods to assess what kind of 
information would constitute personal information.14
 
  
For example, in the UK, the Younger Committee’s Report into Privacy, was asked by the 
Heath Government in 1970 to examine whether privacy legislation was required to provide 
additional protections for individuals and organisations against privacy intrusions.15 The 
Committee found that the main concerns arising from invasions of privacy involved the use 
and misuse of personal information.16
 
 Information that should be classed as personal 
information, and therefore considered for regulation, was information:  
in which a person should be regarded as having something in the nature of a 
proprietary interest...because it relates to him or because he has been entrusted with 
it by the person to whom it relates.17
 
  
The notion of personal information did not entail a private or confidential element though it 
was recognised that such types of information would naturally engender a higher degree of 
care in handling. Furthermore, the Committee attempted to classify how members of the 
public conceived intrusions of privacy and the types of information that individuals would 
                                                     
9 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (1981). 
10 Bygrave, LA, Data Protection Law: Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits, Information Law Series; 10. 
(2002), 34. 
11 Bygrave, LA, Data Protection Law: Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits, Information Law Series; 10. 
(2002), 32. 
12 OECD, 'Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data' (OECD, 1980). 
13 See S T Margulis, 'On the Status and Contribution of Westin's and Altman's Theories of Privacy' (2003) 59(2) 
Journal of Social Issues 411, for an overview of the ‘privacy as control’ paradigm.  
14 The authors acknowledge the distinction between data and information. See e.g. R Wacks, Personal 
Information: Privacy and the Law (1993), 25 “Data become information only when they are communicated, 
received and understood. Data are therefore potential information.” However, for the purposes of this article, the 
concept of personal data and personal information are interchangeable within the ambit of information privacy 
laws. 
15 K R H Younger, Report of the Committee on Privacy (1972), 6. 
16 Ibid. 19. 
17 Ibid. 
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object to being published without their consent.18 The recommendations of the Younger 
Committee were not immediately implemented and instead a further review was conducted in 
1976, under the chairmanship of Sir Norman Lindop19 which ultimately resulted in the 
commencement of the Data Protection Act 1984 (UK).20
 
 
More recent developments in the UK have also given rise to controversy about the 
classification of personal information. In 2003, the Court of Appeal considered the meaning 
of personal data under s1(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998 (UK) (the “DPA”) in the case of 
Durant v FSA.21 Section 1(1) of the DPA gives effect in UK law to Art 2(a) of Directive 
95/4622
 
 and defines personal data as:  
Data which relate to a living individual who can be identified (a) from the data; or 
(b) from those data and other information which is in the possession of or is likely to 
come into the possession of the data controller.  
 
In Durant, the Court was asked to determine whether information held by the Financial 
Services Authority (the “FSA”), relating to an investigation it conducted on behalf of Mr 
Durant against a bank, was classified as personal data under s1(1) of the DPA. The plaintiff 
had previously made a request to the FSA under s7 of the DPA to access four files relating to 
his complaint. The FSA contended that the information held by it was not Durant’s personal 
information and the Authority was therefore not required to provide him with the information. 
The key issue involved whether the information in question ‘related to’ Durant sufficiently for 
it to become personal data under the DPA. The Court’s decision turned on alternative 
definitions of ‘relate to’ in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. The first definition is restrictive in 
nature as it involves having reference to or concern of a data item, whereas the second 
definition is broad as having some connection with or be connected to data.23
                                                     
18 See ibid., 239-240. The Committee conducted a social survey into public attitudes relating to privacy. Not 
surprisingly, perhaps, 87% of respondents objected to the idea of having details of their sex life published with 
income details coming second at 78%. Whereas the lower scale of objections related to nationality (8%), race 
(10%) and occupation (12%). Interestingly, only 51% of respondents would object to the unauthorised 
publication of their medical history. 
 The Court 
favoured the first definition, a decision that has been subject to some criticism because it 
provides an unduly restrictive notion of information that relates to an individual under the 
19 Report of the Committee on Data Protection, H.M.S.O., 1978.  
20 See C J Bennett, Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States 
(1992), 89. But see R Clarke, The Australian Privacy Act 1988 as an Implementation of the OECD Data 
Protection Guidelines (1989) <http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/PActOECD.html> at 9 September 2009 
regarding the UK Government’s reluctance to implement the Committee’s recommendations.  
21 Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746 (8 December 2003) 
22 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [the Data 
Protection Directive], OJ L 281, 23/11/ 1995, 31–50. 
23 See S Chalton, 'The Court of Appeal's Interpretation of "personal data" in Durant v FSA - a Welcome 
Clarification, or a Cat Amongst the Data Protection Pigeons?' (2004) 20(3) Computer Law & Security Report 
175, 176 and M Watts ‘Information, data and personal data – Reflections on Durant v Financial Services 
Authority’ (2006) 22(4) Computer Law & Security Report, 320-325. 
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DPA.24 Furthermore, Jay argues that the Durant decision is inconsistent with the European 
Court of Justice’s (the “ECJ”) decision in Lindqvist25 even though the Court of Appeal 
expressly acknowledged that it was bound to interpret the law in accordance with the EU 
Directive and the decisions of the ECJ.26 In 2008, the House of Lords had an opportunity to 
review the Durant in Common Services Agency v Scottish Information Commissioner27 but 
declined to by stating that there was no reason to consider it in this case.28
 
 Accordingly, 
despite the criticism, the Durant judgment still stands and could be construed as having 
received tacit support from the House of Lords.  
Subsequent to Durant, and perhaps not surprisingly, privacy regulators on both sides of the 
English Channel have provided updated guidance in attempts to clarify what data will be 
classed as personal data. The UK’s Information Commissioner re-issued guidelines in 
February 2006 to take into account the Durant decision and provided a test to identify 
personal data when it is unclear whether the data in question relates to an individual or not.29 
Under the test, if the data is capable of having an adverse impact on an individual’s privacy, 
then it should be deemed to be personal information.30 The Information Commissioner also 
stated that more general guidance would be released that would take into account the work of 
the Article 29 Working Party.31
 
  
The Working Party issued an Opinion on the concept of personal data in June 2007.32 The 
objective of the Opinion was to develop a common understanding of the concept of personal 
data and how it should be applied uniformly in member states. The Opinion reiterated that the 
purpose of the Directive was to protect fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals with 
regard to personal data processing and personal data should therefore be construed broadly.33 
The Working Party also acknowledged the intentional flexibility of the Directive’s language 
in conjunction with its exemptions to strike “an appropriate balance” between the rights of 
data subjects and the legitimate interests of data collectors.34
                                                     
24 See e.g. D Lindsay, 'Misunderstanding ‘Personal Information’: Durant v Financial Services Authority' (2004) 
10(10) Privacy Law and Policy Reporter 13 “This approach to the interpretation of the definition of ‘personal 
data’, however, completely misconceives the role of the definition of ‘personal data’ or ‘personal information’ in 
determining the scope of an information privacy law. The basic assumption of all information privacy laws is 
that the privacy of the data subject is threatened by the processing of any information which identifies the data 
subject, or is capable of identifying the data subject, regardless of the nature of the information.”; S Chalton, 
'The Court of Appeal's Interpretation of "personal data" in Durant v FSA - a Welcome Clarification, or a Cat 
Amongst the Data Protection Pigeons?' (2004) 20(3) Computer Law & Security Report 175, 180 “applying a 
difficult and restrictive interpretation of “personal data” to a wide variety of information linked to identifiable 
individuals may create more difficulties than it solves.” 
 The Working Party reiterated 
25 Bodil Lindqvist v Aklagarkammaren i Jonkoping – Case Commissioner-101/01 – European Court of Justice) 
delivered on 19 September 2002.   
26 See R Jay and A Hamilton, Data Protection Law and Practice (3rd ed, 2007), 132. 
27 Common Services Agency v Scottish Information Commissioner [2008] UKHL 47. 
28 See R Crumbley and P Church, ‘What is Personal Data? The House of Lords Identifies the Issues - Common 
Services Agency v Scottish Information Commissioner [2008] UKHL 47’ (2008)24(6), Computer Law & 
Security Report 565. 
29 Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘The ‘Durant’ Case and its Impact on the Interpretation of the Data 
Protection Act 1998’ (2006). 
30 Ibid.  
31 The Working Party was established under Art. 29 of the Directive and acts as an independent advisory body 
composed of representatives of the national supervisory authorities, on European data protection and privacy 
issues.  
32 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data, 01248/07/EN, 
WP 136 http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf . 
33 Ibid., 4. 
34 Ibid., 5. 
 6 
that undue restrictions regarding the interpretation of personal data should be avoided and it 
was the role of national data protection authorities to develop appropriate legal frameworks to 
ensure the requirements of the Directive were fulfilled. As regards the definition of personal 
data, the Working Party confirmed that information can be considered to relate to an 
individual when it is about that individual.35 As presaged by the Information Commissioner 
himself, the release of the Working Party’s opinion instigated updated guidance from the 
UK’s Information Commissioner about what constituted personal data with clear practical 
guidance for organisations on how to consider whether data relates to an individual.36
 
  
Academic legal debate has highlighted the complexity and inconsistency attaching to the 
conceptualisation of personal information. Wacks contended that instead of pursuing a false 
god of privacy, legislative attention should aim to provide protections for identified and 
specific privacy interests.37 Adopting Westin’s theoretical base, Wacks argued that the core 
problem of privacy emanates from interests claimed by individuals to withhold certain 
information about themselves.38 The concept of personal information is therefore integral to 
the regulation of privacy and any definition of personal information must incorporate two key 
elements: the quality of the information and the reasonable expectations of the individual 
using it.39 Personal information therefore has both a normative and descriptive function 
because the notion of what is personal relates to a desired social norm (e.g. the ability to 
withdraw certain information about oneself) and to describe something as personal accords 
the conditions of the desired social norm (e.g. information as personal information means that 
an individual is granted legal controls over it).40
 
  
Whilst Wacks examines the normative elements of personal information, Bygrave identifies 
common conditions that make up personal information. According to Bygrave, two 
cumulative conditions exist: the information must relate to or concern a person and the 
information must facilitate the identification of a person.41 Identifiability is therefore a key 
underlying basis for defining personal information. Bygrave identifies six issues for 
determining what is personal information and notes that most definitions of personal 
information could mean that almost all pieces of information have a direct relationship with a 
particular person.42 He argues that limitations are required to ensure the ‘semantic viability’ of 
the concept and the effective functioning of regulatory capacities required by information 
privacy laws.43
 
  
The issue of context is therefore important to defining personal information given that any 
piece of information could potentially be classed as personal information. Roth addressed this 
                                                     
35 Ibid., 9. 
36 Information Commissioner’s Office (2007), Data Protection Technical Guidance Determining What is 
Personal Data. 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/personal_data_flow
chart_v1_with_preface001.pdf.   
37 R Wacks, Personal Information: Privacy and the Law (1993), 10. 
38 Ibid., 13. 
39 Ibid., 24. 
40 Ibid., 20. 
41 L A Bygrave, Data Protection Law: Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits, Information Law Series; 10. 
(2002), 42.  
42 Ibid. The six issues are: the concept of identification/identifiability; the ease of identification; the legally 
relevant agent of identification; the accuracy of link between data set and individual; the use of auxiliary 
information and the requirement of individuation.  
43 Ibid., 48. 
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point extensively in his review of New Zealand privacy laws and cases.44 He concluded that 
the complexity surrounding the concept of personal information in New Zealand was partly 
caused by ‘historical baggage’ that saw the development of the Privacy Act 1993 (NZ) 
through two separate pieces of legislation that focused on issues relating to freedom of 
information. As such, personal information under the New Zealand law could have two 
different applications. First, it could relate to “information about a person” such as a name, 
address and other potentially identifying details. Second, personal information could “denote 
information that is ‘personal’ to the individual concerned, in the sense of being ‘private’ or 
‘sensitive’”, for example political, sexual or religious perspectives.45
 
  
It is therefore not possible to determine whether information is personal information “without 
having regard to the context in which it appears or is sought.”46 However, there are situations 
in which certain data “can be converted directly into “information about an identifiable 
individual without any interposing or additional step by which the data might be given such 
meaning.”47
 
 Not only is the definition of personal information therefore conceptually complex 
but the process of personal information production is equally complicated because it depends 
on the contextual situation of a given piece of information and the social setting in which that 
information is used.  
3. Conceptualising Personal Information  
In 2004, The UK’s Information Commissioner Office (the “ICO”) procured research from the 
University of Sheffield to identify the underlying concepts of how worldwide data protection 
authorities defined personal information.48 The Report’s key finding stated there was no 
uncontested and coherent definition of personal data amongst international jurisdictions. Even 
though most jurisdictions adopt similar conceptual frameworks, the researchers identified 
inconsistent understandings among data protection authorities of the conceptual 
underpinnings of personal information, which caused a lack of clarity both within and outside 
the EU. Accordingly, whilst data protection authorities projected clarity on their 
understanding of personal data, there was nevertheless, major inconsistencies in how the term 
was conceptualised and applied.49
 
  
The researchers adopted an inter-disciplinary approach involving legal, sociological and 
psychological understandings of personal data and a two stage empirical approach was 
undertaken. The first stage surveyed thirty-nine data protection authorities to examine how 
personal data was being understood. Eighteen agreed to participate and eleven also agreed to 
participate in a follow up survey. The results of the first stage defined operative concepts 
currently in use by data protection authorities, which were used to develop a theoretical 
approach on how to conceptualise personal information based on existing policy decisions.50
                                                     
44 P Roth, 'What is "Personal Information"?' (2002) 20 New Zeland Universities Law Review 40. 
 
From the results of the first survey, the researchers identified three conceptual underpinnings 
on how data protection authorities identified personal information. They are the capacity of a 
piece of information to either (1) identify an individual (2) affect an individual or (3) identify 
45 Ibid., 41. 
46 Ibid., 54. 
47 Ibid.  
48 S Booth et al, 'What are ‘Personal Data’? A study conducted for the UK Information Commissioner' (The 
University of Sheffield, 2004). The Durant decision was delivered during the research and whilst it obviously 
had a bearing on the final report, the research was not commissioned because of the Durant decision.  
49 Ibid., 9. 
50 Ibid., 9. 
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and affect an individual.51 These options were undeveloped and applied interchangeably 
which created an uncertain environment and thus made predictions of what could be classed 
as personal information problematic.52
 
  
From their findings, the researchers deduced that data protection authorities used two general 
conceptualisations to identify personal information. Context independent conceptualisations 
enabled data protection authorities to identify personal information without recourse to the 
social context within which the information is used.53 In effect, the removal of social context 
simplified the categorisation of personal information because it allowed data protection 
authorities to make a definitive prediction of what information is always likely to be classified 
as personal information. Alternatively, context dependent conceptualisations deem that 
personal information can only be identified by examining the social context within which a 
piece of information is used.54
 
 This makes definitive prediction virtually impossible because 
all information could be classed as personal information in the right circumstances, which are 
likely to be inherently subjective. The researchers subdivided the two conceptualisations to 
create four models regarding the categorisation of personal information by data protection 
authorities, as represented by Figure 1 below.  
Figure 1 – Booth Models for Conceptualising Personal Information 
 
First is the Unique Identifier (the “UID”) model. In this category, personal information is 
defined as information that is uniquely related to an individual. Because personal information 
is inimitable, it cannot be anonymised so the unique identifier will always continue to be 
related to an identifiable person.55
                                                     
51 Ibid., 95. 
 Personal information is therefore information that resists 
52 Ibid. The authors asserted that there was a “need to develop a robust, express, theoretical and defensible 
framework within which the concept of ‘personal data’ can begin to be understood.” 
53 Ibid., 94.  
54 See ibid., 95. 
55 Ibid., 96.  
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anonymisation because it contains in itself all that is required to identify an individual.56 The 
social context of information usage is irrelevant because personal information, under this 
model, links directly to an individual without reference to any other information. The authors 
concluded that in practice, it is rare to find data that can identify a person without recourse to 
other data and it is inevitable, in the vast majority of cases, that some linking of data is 
required to identify an individual. 57
 
 
Second, the Context Independent Affects (the “CIA”) model defines personal information as 
information which is capable of affecting an individual in a relevant way.58 Accordingly, 
personal information must be capable of affecting an individual in a material way. For 
example, information is only personal information if it affects an individual’s privacy.59
 
 The 
CIA model is broader than the UID model because it places identification in a particular 
social context, albeit a limited one. It may be possible to anticipate a particular information 
type’s ability to affect an individual’s privacy which acknowledges that a piece of information 
can have a wider affect than simple one to one identification from data to person. The CIA 
model therefore attempts to reduce rather than ignore social context. 
The first context dependent approach is the Context Dependent Identifier (the “CDI”) model 
which defines personal information as information which may identify an individual.60 
Personal information may therefore not be unique to an individual and may not necessarily 
identify an individual directly from the information itself. The CDI model thus refers to the 
notion of data sharing and the combined ability to link disparate data together to identify an 
individual.61 All information could potentially be personal information because any 
information is capable of identifying an individual in the right circumstances.62 To limit the 
scope of the CDI model, the researchers indicated that it was necessary to distinguish between 
actual availability of context and theoretical availability of context. Actual availability refers 
to information that informs about an individual whereas theoretical availability refers to the 
possibility that information may inform about an individual.63
                                                     
56 See ibid., 99 regarding the different characteristics of unique identifiers which may lead to the identification of 
an individual. For example, a PIN number is a unique identifier that relies on a four digit number. It is therefore 
not possible to identify an individual from the PIN number alone and requires recourse to the card with which it 
is linked. However, some forms of driving licence are constructed by using a combination of first name letters 
and numbers that may make identification possible from the information. 
 For example, the information in 
question does not directly inform about an individual, but in certain contexts, it is more or less 
likely to enable identification when linked to other pieces of information. Categorisation of 
personal information therefore shifts focus from the information itself, to balancing the risk of 
57 See S Booth et al, 'What are ‘Personal Data’? A study conducted for the UK Information Commissioner' (The 
University of Sheffield, 2004), 96-7. The example that is used often in the Report is DNA which has all the 
requirements within itself to identify an individual. However, as highlighted by the researchers, a definitive 
classification of identity from DNA requires recourse to certain technological techniques and processes to enable 
identification. However, survey results highlight that a small number of countries exhibited UID model 
tendencies in their application of dental records and national insurance numbers as always being personal 
information. 
58 Ibid., 53 
59 See ibid., 103, where the authors assert “‘Personal data’, according to this model, doesn’t have to be able to 
identify the individual itself; it will be sufficient (but also necessary) for the information in question to be 
capable of affecting the ‘privacy’ of an individual that has been/may be identified via other means.” 
60 Ibid., 100. 
61 See ibid. “According to this concept then, it is not the uniqueness of the data per se, that is significant but the 
availability of a context (possibly informed by other identifiers) within which that data may function as a unique 
identifier.” 
62 Ibid., 101. 
63 Ibid., 102. 
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realising the actual or possible identification of an individual from collective pieces of 
information.  
 
Finally, the Context Dependent Affects (the “CDA”) model defines personal information as 
information which may affect an individual in a relevant way. All information is potentially 
capable of being personal information as any information is capable of affecting an individual 
in a relevant way in the right circumstances.64 Practical day-to-day concerns relate to 
information that is capable of affecting an individual’s privacy. The application of the model 
is tested on a case-by-case basis that takes account of a specific context and determines the 
information should be categorised as personal information based on the impact it may have on 
an individual’s privacy.65
 
 In summary, Table 1 details the advantages and disadvantages of all 
four models as identified by the researchers.  
Table 1 – Advantages and Disadvantages of the Booth Models 
 
Model Advantages Disadvantages 
UID Enables definitive categorisation of personal 
data. 
 
 
Overestimates the extent that any piece of data 
may be independent of context. 
 
Underestimates the significance of context. Most 
data and most identifiers are only unique in a 
given social context. 
 
CIA Potentially enables definitive categorisation 
of personal data within a specific social 
context (e.g. the protection of an 
individual’s privacy). 
 
Potentially anticipates whether particular 
data types will affect an individual’s privacy 
without taking account of social context. 
 
Protects privacy rather than prevention of 
identity. 
 
Underestimates the extent that context 
considerations play when assessing an individual’s 
privacy. All data could potentially be personal data 
which precludes judgements about whether a type 
of data will always affect an individual’s privacy. 
 
Encompasses an untenable concept of privacy 
because it presupposes that specific data types may 
impact upon the privacy of dissimilar individuals’ 
in similar ways. The model therefore has a very 
narrow perspective as it disregards the production 
of privacy and personal data as social context.  
 
CDI Extends the boundaries of personal data to 
include the notion of linking data as a 
context to identify an individual. 
 
Recognises the significance of information 
context and allows a determination of 
personal data based on identification that 
takes into account relative social contexts. 
Prevents definitive categorisation of personal data 
because theoretically any data and any context 
could transform data into personal data.  
 
Precludes risk assessments of what data is likely to 
constitute personal data. 
 
CDA Restricts the categorisation of personal data 
based on context to what actually affects an 
individual’s privacy. 
 
Acknowledges the complex nature of 
privacy as an interaction between an 
individual and society. 
 
Precludes definitive categorisation because the 
classification of personal data entails a subjective 
process that involves the interaction between an 
individual and their society that could include all 
data.  
 
Prevents delineation from actual/theoretical 
distinctions that minimises attempts to identify the 
                                                     
64 Ibid., 104. 
65 Ibid. 
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Model Advantages Disadvantages 
contexts that a data types will impact on an 
individual’s privacy.  
 
 
4. Definitions of Personal Information in Australian Privacy Laws66
The first Australian privacy laws started to appear in the early 1970s.
 
67 These laws were 
driven by specific technological advancements and were not universally adopted throughout 
Australia at that time. Nevertheless, concerns regarding the protection of individual privacy 
culminated in the mid 1970’s when the Australian Law Reform Commission (the “ALRC) 
was asked to undertake a wide-ranging review of privacy in Australia including issues 
relating to the collection, storage and use of personal information.68 The ALRC reported back 
to the Australian Government in 1983 and made recommendations regarding issues relating to 
the handling of personal information, largely based on the OECD’s Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data.69 As to the definition of 
personal information, the ALRC took a broad view of what should be construed as personal 
information by stating that any information about a natural person should be regarded as 
personal information. Moreover, the link between an individual and the information in 
question did not have to be ‘explicit’. If a piece of information could be easily combined with 
other information, to make an individual’s identity apparent, then that information should be 
regarded as personal information.’70
 
  That basic precept has embodied the statutory definition 
of personal information applied in Australian privacy laws as highlighted in the remainder of 
this section below. 
For the purposes of this article, three categories of legislation or legislative proposals are 
adduced in which personal information are identified.71
 
 Firstly, the legislative approach to 
information privacy regulation in Australia can be categorised into two broad groups. 
Category 1 represents Australian privacy laws which have followed the Privacy Act and its 
definition of personal information and Category 2 signifies those laws which have not. 
Category 3 encompasses a new definition of personal information put forward by the ALRC 
from its recent review of privacy. Table 2 below details these separate definitions of personal 
information in Australian privacy laws. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
66 At the onset of this section, it is important to highlight that the issue of information context (i.e. the social 
context that a piece of information is used in) has been integral to the definitional development of personal 
information in Australian privacy laws. See also ibid., 85 where the researchers state that Country 36 (Australia) 
has “emphasised the significance of context and more explicitly emphasised the significance of identification.”  
67 See for example, the Invasion of Privacy Act 1971(Qld) which was enacted following concerns relating to the 
use of listening devices for surveillance purposes. See also Listening & Surveillance Devices Act (1972) (SA). 
68 Australian Law Reform Commission, Privacy (ALRC 22), 1983. 
69 OECD, 'Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data' (OECD, 1980) 
70 Australian Law Reform Commission, Privacy (ALRC 22), Vol. 2, 82, 1983. 
71 The authors have not included the provisions of the Data Matching Program (Assistance and Tax) Act 1990 
(Cth) in this review of Australian privacy laws because the purpose of the legislation is not primarily designed to 
provide individual privacy protections. However, we acknowledge that the Act’s various definitions of different 
types of data could be pertinent to this article.  
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Table 2 – Definitions of Personal Information in Australian Privacy Law 
 
Category Legislation Definition of Personal Information 
1 s. 6(1) Privacy Act 1988 (Cth); 
s. 4 Information Privacy Act 
2000, s. 3 (VIC); s. 12 
Information Privacy Act 2009 
(QLD) 
 
Information or an opinion (including information or an 
opinion forming part of a database), whether true or not, 
and whether recorded in a material form or not, about an 
individual whose identity is apparent, or can reasonably 
be ascertained, from the information or opinion. 
 
2 
 
 
s. 4 Privacy and Personal 
Information Protection Act 1998 
(NSW) 
(a) Information or an opinion (including information or 
an opinion forming part of a database), whether true or 
not, and whether recorded in a material form or not, about 
an individual whose identity is apparent, or can 
reasonably be ascertained, from the information or 
opinion. 
 
(b) includes such things as an individual’s fingerprints, 
retina prints, body samples or genetic characteristics. 
 
s.3 Information Act 2002 (NT) 
 
Government information from which a person's identity is 
apparent or is reasonably able to be ascertained 
 
Cabinet Administrative 
Instruction No.1 of 1989 (SA) 
 
 
Information or an opinion, whether true or not, relating to 
a natural person or the affairs of a natural person whose 
identity is apparent, or can reasonably be ascertained, 
from the information or opinion. 
 
s.3 Personal Information 
Protection Act 2004 (TAS) 
 
 
Basic personal information means the name, residential 
address, postal address, date of birth and gender of an 
individual 
 
Personal information means any information or opinion 
in any recorded format about an individual (a) whose 
identity is apparent or is reasonably ascertainable from 
the information or opinion; and (b) who is alive or has not 
been dead for more than 25 years. 
 
s. 6 Information Privacy Bill 
2007 (WA) 
 
Information or an opinion, whether true or not, and 
whether recorded in a material form or not, about an 
individual, whether living or dead (a) whose identity is 
apparent or can reasonably be ascertained from the 
information or opinion; or (b) who can be identified by 
reference to an identifier or an identifying particular such 
as a fingerprint, retina print or body sample. 
 
3 ALRC 108 Information or an opinion, whether true or not, and 
whether recorded in a material form or not, about an 
identified or reasonably identifiable individual’. 
 
 
4.1 Category 1 – The Privacy Act & Complimentary State Acts 
The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (the “Privacy Act”) was passed by the Commonwealth 
Parliament to give effect to an agreement to implement the OECD Guidelines, as well as 
Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. That said, the focus of 
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the Privacy Act is very much on the former rather than the latter.72
 
 The Act regulates the 
conduct of agencies, in a public sector context, including the Government of the Australian 
Capital Territory (ACT), and organisations in the private sector, by affecting the ways in 
which those bodies are permitted to deal with personal information. The Privacy Act also 
forms the basis of separate state-based legislation that regulates certain state government 
agencies. As such, the Act does not prescribe privacy rights to individuals per se, but rather 
seeks to implement a principled approach to privacy regulation that is technology neutral and 
not corrosive of other rights and freedoms enjoyed in a liberal democracy. 
The Privacy Act’s definition of personal information has a broad application. Information 
does not have to identify a person directly for it to be classed as personal information. For 
example, it is possible for a record to be classed as personal information, even if a person is 
not mentioned by name, but can be identified by cross-referencing data in the record, with 
other data that identifies that individual.73 This approach is closely aligned with the OECD 
Guidelines and its definition of personal data. However, there is a key distinction between the 
definition of personal data in the OECD Guidelines and the Privacy Act. The Guidelines 
define personal information as data relating to “identified or identifiable individuals.” As 
highlighted in the earlier discussion of what is personal information in a European context, 
this definition leaves open the possibility of combining information that relates to an 
individual that can lead to identification. The OECD Guidelines do not require that the 
information in question must in itself lead to identification of an individual. The Privacy Act, 
on the other hand, states that information will be personal information if an individual’s 
identity is apparent or can reasonably be ascertained from the information itself. The 
Australian definition therefore reduces the scope of “relating to” because it requires the 
information itself to have the capacity to identify without reference to other information.74
 
 
The definition of personal information found in the Privacy Act has been incorporated directly 
into state based privacy legislation in Victoria and Queensland. In Victoria, the Information 
Privacy Act 2000 (VIC) (the “Victorian Act”) regulates the collection, storage and use of 
personal information by Victorian Government agencies and other public sector entities. The 
Act’s implementing bill was initially designed to provide stronger controls in the form of its 
Information Privacy Principles (the “IPPs”) but were subsequently amended through its 
legislative passage to effect the amendments put forward in the Privacy Act (Private Sector 
Amendment) Act 2000 (Cth).75 Likewise, the definition of personal information in the 
Victorian Act is exactly the same as that found in the Privacy Act save for the exclusion of 
information that would be covered under section 3 of the Health Records Act 2001 (VIC) 
which covers a range of health related information.76
                                                     
72 See R Clarke, The Australian Privacy Act 1988 as an Implementation of the OECD Data Protection 
Guidelines (1989) <http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/PActOECD.html> at 9 September 2009 regarding the basis 
of the OECD’s review of member information privacy laws that was based on strengthening the free flow of 
personal information rather than human rights concerns.  
 Finally, the recent enactment of the 
Information Privacy Act 2009 (QLD) was intended to provide for “the fair collection and 
73 For example, written records about a person; a photograph or image of a person; fingerprints or DNA samples 
that identify a person or information about a person that is not written down, but which is in the possession or 
control of the agency. 
74 See R Clarke, The Australian Privacy Act 1988 as an Implementation of the OECD Data Protection 
Guidelines (1989) <http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/PActOECD.html> at 9 September 2009 who suggests that 
the problem of definition actually arose in the ALRC’s draft privacy bill. 
75 See M Jackson and G L Hughes, Hughes on Data Protection in Australia (2nd ed, 2001), 180. 
76 S 3 Information Privacy Act 2000 (VIC). For example, health information can include information or an 
opinion about the physical, mental or psychological health of an individual; a disability of an individual; or an 
individual's expressed wishes about the future provision of health services to him or her.  
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handling in the public sector environment of personal information.”77 The Act also 
incorporates exactly, the Privacy Act’s definition of personal information.78
 
 
4.2 Category 2 – Alternative Legislative Approaches 
Whilst the two states highlighted above, and the ACT, have all adopted the same definition of 
personal information found in the Privacy Act, the remaining states and the Northern Territory 
have implemented information privacy legislation that incorporates a different definition of 
personal information. For example, in New South Wales (NSW), the Privacy and Personal 
Information Protection Act (the “PPIPA”) was enacted in 1998 and contains a set of privacy 
principles that regulate how NSW agencies handle personal information. The PPIPA is based 
on NSW’s own information privacy principles which are similar in form but stronger in 
substance than those contained in the Privacy Act.79 Whereas the first part of the definition of 
personal information is exactly the same as in the Privacy Act, it is intended to have a broader 
application that also covers opinions and knowledge gained through perception that is 
independent of the form in which information is collected.80 This broader definition is 
balanced against a wider range of exclusions where the PPIPA will not apply.81
 
 Moreover, an 
additional requirement is added to the definition that covers specific types of biometric unique 
identifiers. 
The Northern Territory Information Act 2002 (NT) (the “NT Act”) is unique amongst its 
Australian counterparts because it incorporates information privacy, freedom of information 
and public records legislation within one single act.82 The NT Act commenced in July 2003 
and governs how Northern Territory public sector organisations collect, use and store 
personal information. The definition of personal information used in the NT Act differs to the 
Privacy Act in two key ways. First, it only applies to government information83. Second, and 
more importantly for the purposes of this article, the definition states that government 
information will only be personal information in situations “from which a person's identity is 
apparent or is reasonably able to be ascertained” [emphasis added]. On the other hand, South 
Australia (SA) does not have specific privacy legislation but the SA Government has issued 
an administrative instruction requiring government committees to comply with South 
Australian privacy principles based on the IPPs.84
 
 The definition of personal information 
differs to the Privacy Act in three ways. First, the SA definition adopts the concept of “relate 
to” that is unique in Australian privacy law and is presumably derived from the EU’s data 
protection directive. Second, and of less significance, the instruction refers to a natural person 
rather than an individual. Third, the definition of personal information also covers the affairs 
of a natural person.  
In Tasmania, the Personal Information Protection Act 2004 (TAS) (the “PIPA”) came into 
effect on 5 September 2005 and also differs to the Privacy Act because it operates under a two 
                                                     
77 Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) s 3(1). 
78 S 12 Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld). 
79 See M Jackson and G L Hughes, Hughes on Data Protection in Australia (2nd ed, 2001), 187. 
80 See New South Wales Law Reform Commission, 'Consultation Paper 3 - Privacy Legislation in New South 
Wales' (2008), 25 “information about a person that is not written down, but which is in the possession or control 
of the agency.” 
81 Ibid., 26. 
82 M Paterson, Freedom of Information and Privacy in Australia: Government and Information Access in the 
Modern State (2005), 537.  
83 Under the NT Act, government information means a record held by or on behalf of a public sector 
organisation and includes personal information. 
84 See M Jackson and G L Hughes, Hughes on Data Protection in Australia (2nd ed, 2001), 160.  
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tier definitional requirement that includes personal information and basic personal 
information. The definition of personal information is largely the same as the Privacy Act 
with the exception that it only applies to individuals who are alive or deceased individuals 
who have not died in the last 25 years. However, basic personal information is specifically 
identified.85 The purpose of the distinction is to allow agencies to use or disclose basic 
personal information to other public sector bodies, under section 12 of the PIPA, without the 
consent of individuals and where the use or disclosure is “reasonably necessary for the 
efficient storage and use of that information.”86 Finally, Western Australia does not currently 
regulate privacy in the public sector by reference to an express legislative privacy 
instrument.87 On 28 March 2007, the Information Privacy Bill 2007 was introduced to the 
Western Australian Parliament.  The Bill was introduced to the Legislative Council for second 
reading in December 2007 and it has remained there since. The definition of personal 
information used departs from the Privacy Act because, like the Tasmanian PIPA, the Bill 
provides a tiered definitional structure that incorporates the Privacy Act’s two elements and 
provides a further tier based on certain unique identifiers.88
 
  
4.3 Category 3 – ALRC 108: A New Way Forward 
On 31 January 2006, the Attorney-General of Australia announced that the ALRC was to be 
tasked with a review of privacy in Australia, with particular reference to the functioning of the 
Privacy Act.89 In the Commission’s final report,90 delivered in 2008, the ALRC recommended 
that a greater level of national consistency regarding the regulation of privacy was required. 
The ALRC recommended that all Australian Governments’ should develop and adopt an 
intergovernmental agreement that sets up a co-operative scheme to enact new provisions 
including the application of model Unified Privacy Principles (the “UPPs”).91 As regards the 
definition of personal information, the ALRC considered that the current definition of 
personal information should be changed.92 The ALRC re-emphasised that personal 
information should be about an individual who can be identified or who’s identity can be 
reasonably identifiable.93 The ALRC also recommended that one of the key elements of the 
current definition, that personal information includes “information or an opinion forming part 
of a database” should be deleted.94
 
  
More importantly, the ALRC recommended that the phrase “whose identity is apparent or can 
be reasonably ascertained from the information” be amended in line with other jurisdictions 
                                                     
85 Basic personal information means the name, residential address, postal address, date of birth and gender of an 
individual. 
86 G Greenleaf and L A Bygrave, 'Tasmania’s Privacy Law due to Start' (2005) 11(7) Privacy Law and Policy 
Reporter.  
87 However, the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA) does regulate government agencies having regard to the 
concepts of ‘confidential information’ and ‘confidential communications’ provisions. 
88 Section 6(1)(b) of the Bill “who can be identified by reference to an identifier or an identifying particular such 
as a fingerprint, retina print or body sample.” 
89 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of privacy : Issues paper, 31 (2007). 
90 Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice (2008) 
91 The current provisions of the Privacy Act provide two sets of privacy principles, the Information Privacy 
Principles (IPPs), which apply to the Australian Government and the ACT, and the National Privacy Principles 
(NPPs) that apply to private sector organisations. 
92 Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice (2008), 
306, because it did not “reflect the standards set in international instruments dealing with the privacy of personal 
information.” 
93 Ibid., 306. 
94 Ibid., 307. The Commission contended that the removal was necessary “because there is little doubt in this day 
and age that personal information is held in electronic databases.” 
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and international instruments.95 The Privacy Act should therefore apply to information about 
an individual who is “identified or reasonably identifiable” rather than information about an 
individual whose “identity” is apparent, or reasonably ascertainable.96 A reasonableness 
element should also be included as part of any future definition which means that whether an 
individual can be identified or is identifiable will depend on context and circumstances. 
Moreover, actual rather than theoretical circumstances would be the determining factor for 
deciding whether a piece of information could be categorised as personal information.97 An 
individual can therefore be reasonably identifiable when he or she can be identified from 
information held in the possession or organisation and access to that information would not be 
prohibitive in terms of cost or difficulty. The test for confirming whether a piece of 
information is likely to be personal information therefore requires “a consideration of the cost, 
difficulty, practicality and likelihood that the information will be linked in such as way as to 
identify [an individual].”98 As a limiting factor the ALRC rejected the idea that the test should 
include whether an individual is potentially identifiable.99 Nevertheless, the ALRC re-
affirmed that the basis of information as personal information is still context specific.100
 
  
Furthermore, information that simply allows an individual to be contacted, such as a 
telephone number or address, would not in itself be classed as personal information as the 
Privacy Act was not intended to provide an unqualified right to be left alone.101 However, as 
noted above, once other information accretes around a specific piece of information, and an 
agency or organisation is then able to target that individual “by linking data in an address 
database with particular names in the same or another database, that information is personal 
information.”102
 
 The complexities of defining personal information were acknowledged by the 
ALRC and the Commission recommended that practical ongoing guidance would always be 
required to minimise the theoretical uncertainties arising and such guidance should indicate 
how the definition of personal information is intended to operate in specific contexts.  
In October 2009, the Australian Government gave its response to the first tranche of 197 
recommendations put forward by the ALRC.103 As to the new definition of personal 
information, the Government accepted the ALRC’s recommendation because it is important 
that the definition of personal information in the Privacy Act is “sufficiently flexible and 
technology-neutral to encompass changes in the way that information that identifies an 
individual is collected and handled.”104
                                                     
95 Ibid.  
 The Government response stated that the definition 
managed to overcome the competing requirements of having a definition that was up to date 
with international developments but also manage to the retain the scope of what is personal 
96 Ibid. 
97 See ibid where the Commission states, “While it may be technically possible for an agency or organisation to 
identify individuals from information it holds, for example, by linking the information with information held by 
another agency or related organisation, it may be that it is not practically possible. For example, logistics or 
legislation may prevent such linkage. In these circumstances, individuals are not ‘reasonably identifiable’.” 
98 Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice (2008), 
308. 
99 Ibid. because a “great deal of information is about potentially identifiable individuals but where identifying the 
individuals would involve unreasonable expense or difficulty, and is unlikely to happen.” 
100 Ibid.  
101 Ibid., 309. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Australian Government, First Stage Response to the Australian Law Reform Commission Report 108, 
http://www.pmc.gov.au/privacy/alrc_docs/stage1_aus_govt_response.pdf.  
104 Ibid., 24. 
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information under the existing definition. Furthermore, the contextual element of the 
definition was addressed as follows: 
 
The application of ‘reasonably identifiable’ ensures the definition continues to be 
based on factors which are relevant to the context and circumstances in which the 
information is collected and held. The Government proposes that this element of the 
definition will be informed by whether it would be reasonable and practicable to 
identify the individual from both the information itself and other reasonably 
accessible information.105
 
  
The Government also accepted the recommendations put forward that required the Privacy 
Commissioner to provide updated guidance about the meaning of “identified” or “reasonably 
identifiable” to assist all parties to understand the scope and application of the new definition 
especially given its contextual nature.106 Finally, the Government encouraged the Privacy 
Commissioner to develop guidance on the meaning of “not reasonably identifiable” in 
conjunction with guidance about de-identified data in relation to the data security principle.107
 
 
5. The Conceptual Basis of Personal Information in Australian Privacy Laws 
Adopting the Booth models as a comparator, it is easy to appreciate that there is no coherent 
Australian approach to the statutory identification of personal information and various 
approaches employ both context dependant and context independent models. However, 
different laws place different degrees of emphasis on the requirements of each model as 
highlighted in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 – Application of Booth Models to Australian Privacy Instruments 
 
Category Legislation UID CIA  CDA  CDI  
1 Privacy Act etc    + 
2 
 
 
Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 
1998 (NSW) 
+    
Information Act 2002 (NT) +    
Cabinet Administrative Instruction No.1 of 1989 (SA) 
 
   + 
Personal Information Protection Act 2004 (TAS) +    
Information Privacy Bill 2007 (WA) 
 
+    
3 ALRC 108 +   - 
 
Beginning with Category 1, on the face of it, the Privacy Act’s definition of personal 
information appears sufficiently wide to cover each of the four conceptual models conceived 
in the Booth Report. For example, where “identity is apparent” is a test that is context 
independent. In that sense, the first element of the Privacy Act definition pertains to the UID 
model as personal information is information that manifests identity without recourse to other 
                                                     
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid., 25. 
 18 
information. However, as highlighted above, the circumstances in which a given piece of 
information makes the identity of an individual apparent is going to be rare because the UID 
model is predicated on the sole use unique identifiers. The basis of the UID model therefore 
goes against broad range application of the Privacy Act which seeks to define personal 
information in a non-exhaustive and incorporative way.  
 
The contextual aspect of identification is recognised in the second element of the Privacy Act 
definition, namely those situations where an individual’s identity “can be reasonably 
ascertained.” This is very much context dependent. A classification that a piece of 
information will be personal information is based not only on the type of information in 
question but also on the context in which that information is applied. The Privacy Act 
definition of personal information does not address the capacity of a given piece of personal 
information to affect an individual’s privacy. Instead, the focus of the Act’s first definitional 
element regards the identification of an individual as a cause of privacy infringement. For 
example, section 13(a) of the Privacy Act indicates that agency practices can constitute an 
actionable interference upon an individual’s privacy if that practice or act breaches one of the 
IPPs. Under section 36, an individual has recourse for breach of the Act by notifying the 
Privacy Commissioner of their grievance. It is clear therefore that identity and affect are 
intended to constitute two separate elements. An actionable interference will by necessity 
involve an individual’s privacy but that interference is not solely based on the ability to 
identify an individual. Rather, it is based on an agency or organisations failure to provide 
specified safeguards regarding the collection, storage and use of an individual’s personal 
information. Whilst it is likely that an actionable interference will always have recourse to 
some degree of identity issues, it does not in itself require a negative affect from identity to 
trigger a privacy infringement.  
 
The Booth Report highlighted that Australia108 was a jurisdiction that emphasised the 
significance of context and more explicitly emphasised the significance of identification.109 
The authors of the report also contended that Australia, based on the survey responses 
received, could be said to have a conceptual framework based on the CDI model.110
 
 This point 
is also borne out by the survey response received by the researchers: 
I come back to the issue of context – perhaps most, if not all, of these data sets could 
be personal data in the right circumstances (i.e. In the right combination of other 
data and/or collected by the kind of entity/person that has the facility/means to use it 
to identify the individual). Perhaps it is more a matter of degree of likelihood of such 
data being identifiable.111
 
  
Despite the first element of the Privacy Act definition of personal information, it would seem 
that context is the key conceptual element to the definition of personal information by 
Australian regulators. Given the link exhibited between context and identity, the CDI model 
accurately describes the overall conceptual basis of defining personal information particularly 
under the second element of the Privacy Act. It therefore follows that the scheme of the Act, 
                                                     
108 Data protection authorities were granted anonymity for the survey and Australia was given the code Country 
36. However, it is possible to identify Australia, and hence the OPC, because of the definition of personal 
information provided.  
109 S Booth et al, 'What are ‘Personal Data’? A study conducted for the UK Information Commissioner' (The 
University of Sheffield, 2004), 85. 
110 Ibid., 85. 
111 Ibid., 86. 
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which has been replicated by Victoria and Queensland creates a basis for privacy regulation 
which is equally as dependant on context as it is on the definition of defined principles and 
terms. 
 
However, these principles are not so readily transferred into those Category 2 states and the 
Northern Territory which have adopted different definitions of personal information that place 
different degrees of emphasis on the UID and CDI models. For example, the NT Act adopts 
the phrase “from which” in its definition of personal information which appears to be an 
artefact from the original ALRC 22 report.112
 
 However, whilst the ALRC confirmed that the 
approach was intended to be contextually oriented, the effect of the phrase “from which” is to 
potentially limit the means of identification by requiring the information itself to give rise to 
the identity of an individual. In that sense, the use of ‘from which’ purveys an intention to 
reduce information context by ensuring that identification must arise from the information 
itself. By doing so, this restricts the ambit of information context and therefore the NT Act’s 
definition of personal information emphasises a conceptual underpinning that is predicated 
more on the UID than the CDI model.  
Like the NT Act, the South Australian administrative instruction is unique in Australian 
privacy laws because the definition of personal information employs the ‘relate to’ statutory 
construction that is associated with the EU’s Data Protection Directive. Again, this would 
appear to be a throwback from the inception of information privacy law into Australia as the 
SA administrative instruction adopted the definition of personal information found in the 
OECD Guidelines. However, the use of “relate to” could differ markedly compared to the NT 
Act’s definition that includes “from which.” As highlighted above, with the exception of the 
Durant case, the statutory use of relate to has a broader application that goes beyond the 
requirement of a piece of information to give rise to the identity of an individual before it 
should be classed as personal information. The purpose of using the “relate to” as part of the 
definition of personal information purveys an intention to incorporate rather than minimise 
information context. Accordingly, the SA administrative instruction has the effect of 
emphasising information context under the CDI model rather than attempting to mitigate 
context through an approach based on the UID model. 
 
However, the opposite is the case with both the Tasmanian and West Australian definitions of 
personal information. The Tasmanian definition of basic personal information provides 
specific guidelines as to the information that will be personal information. Such information 
includes a name, residential address, postal address date of birth and gender. On the face of it, 
the clear description of items of information gives rise to a conceptual framework predicated 
on notions of context independence because the purpose of specifying certain types of 
information attempts to reduce or mitigate context apparent situations. However, the 
Tasmanian legislation appears to adopt a different approach. The specification of certain types 
of information, such as name, may mean that identification is solely possible from that 
information, depending on the popularity or uniqueness of an individual’s name. This cannot 
apply to the other types of information listed, particularly gender, which require some form of 
context analysis to reveal the identity of an individual. For example, an address or gender 
information will not in itself reveal the identity of an individual. This information will only do 
so in comparison with other information such as a name, address and gender. The use of basic 
personal information in the Tasmanian Act is more akin to a type of foundational building 
block for context based appraisals using certain pieces of information. It therefore has both 
                                                     
112 See e.g. Australian Law Reform Commission, Privacy (ALRC 22), Vol. 2, 82, 1983. 
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context dependent and context independent elements. The typification of certain pieces of 
information creates a more workable definition of what is personal information which will 
ultimately depend on the context upon which it is used.  
 
The definition of personal information in the PIPPA and the WA Bill incorporates the Privacy 
Act definition, but significantly it also provides for the situation where specific types of 
unique identifiers will also be classed as personal information. Both definitions therefore 
provide for the possibility that three different types of information can be classified as 
personal information. That is information about an individual that is apparent, information 
about an individual whose identity may be reasonably ascertainable and specific types of 
information that are unique to that individual. However, the addition of the clause relating 
specifically to unique identifier information could emphasise or encompass aspects of both 
the UID and CDI models. The definition clearly attempts to define information that will give 
rise to a classification of personal information in the form of unique identifiers or biometric 
data. Nevertheless, the use of the phrase “by reference to” connotes a contextual element as it 
indicates that information could be classified as personal information if it can be used in 
conjunction with specific forms of identifiers that reveal the identity of an individual. The 
emphasis though is towards the UID model and the effect of minimising the contextual 
elements that could give rise to a classification of personal information based on reference to 
unique identifiers. 
 
Rather than specifying the types of information that will be personal information, both the 
Tasmanian and Western Australian definitions preclude the situations in which certain types 
of information will give rise to identification. In essence, it minimises theoretical analysis of 
information that might make an identity reasonably ascertainable by focusing on actual 
information that makes an identity apparent. In that sense, the use of this type of definition of 
personal information could have serious limits regarding future classification of information 
as personal information because it has a strong delimiting factor by reducing the scope of 
information that may be personal information, as identified through a contextual analysis. 
This approach could therefore limit severely the development of future jurisprudence which 
means that the definition may not cope well with technological development.  
 
Finally, in Category 3, the ALRC’s recommendation for a new definition of personal 
information will depart substantially from the Privacy Act’s definition. The focus of the 
definition remains identity and the two elements from the existing law remains the same, 
personal information is information that can identify an individual but also has the capacity to 
identify through information context. However, the new definition re-emphasises the link 
between identity and context. There is no doubt that the underlying conceptual purpose of 
defining personal information relates to the identity of an individual. Moreover, the new 
definition significantly reduces the practical situations in which a piece of information can 
identify a person. For example, under the previous definition, the use of the term “apparent” 
provided a limited scope of flexibility to determine whether a piece of information gave rise 
to the identification of an individual. Even though this part of the definition was inherently 
context independent, there remained an element of contextual analysis in the decision relating 
to whether an identity was apparent. The ALRC have sought to remove that flexibility in the 
new definition by stating that information is personal information only when an individual is 
identifiable from the information in question. As such, the change in definition re-emphasises 
context independence.  
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Likewise, the second element also has some interesting and perhaps contradictory results. The 
ALRC acknowledged that a reasonableness element will still be a part of a context based 
determination relating to whether a piece of information is personal information. This point is 
re-emphasised by the Australian Government’s response. Yet if that is the case, it is curious 
that the ALRC recommended the removal of the term “reasonably” from the new definition. 
The reason for doing so appears to involve the minimisation of theoretical analysis and the 
enhancement of identity based on actual circumstances. The contextual analysis to be 
undertaken when examining whether a piece of information is personal information involves 
the actual realities and practical expectations of normal working practices that relate to cost 
and ease of information aggregation. In effect, the ALRC recognise the importance of context 
based analysis, but at the same time, they are putting forward a context analysis based on 
actual rather than theoretical circumstances. This will have the effect of reducing the 
possibilities of when information can be personal information by placing any adjudication of 
such decisions within the remit of organisational exigencies. Therefore, while it is 
theoretically possible for a government agency to link one set of data with another to make 
individuals identifiable, an assessment of whether that is possible will be based on the actual 
capabilities, both in terms of cost, skill and technological ability, of the agency in question. In 
that sense, the new definition is still based on the CDI model but it attempts to minimise the 
scope of interpretative analysis of information context.  
 
6. The Need for Coherence – The Development of Jurisprudential Discourse Based on a 
Conceptual Foundation 
 
The above analysis demonstrates that the conceptual basis of personal information in 
Australian privacy laws entails balancing the requirements of certainty provided by context 
independent analysis and the need for flexibility gained through a context based investigation. 
The authors contend that the key issue for future development does not entail a choice of one 
particular definition of personal information over another because it is likely that the 
implementation of the ALRC’s recent proposals will have the effect of unifying different 
definitions and approaches of conceptualising personal information.  
 
The implementation of the ALRC’s new definition of personal information will engender a 
uniformed approach to conceptualise personal information which will be supplanted by 
specific guidance from the Privacy Commissioner. This will of course ameliorate many of the 
issues highlighted in this article. Nevertheless, as highlighted above, the conceptual 
underpinning of the ALRC’s definition, whilst acknowledging and accepting the 
incorporation of context in the identification of personal information, seeks to minimise the 
scope of contextual analysis by placing such issues within the bounds of organisational 
exigencies. Whilst this makes much practical sense, the distinction between what is an actual 
and theoretical circumstance is likely to be a situation in constant flux given the rapid 
technological advancements involving the collection, storage and use of personal information. 
The authors assert that adjudications on these points would be better conducted by the courts 
which emphasises the importance of developing a jurisprudential discourse about appropriate 
conceptual approaches to the identification and classification of personal information in 
technologically advanced societies. However, this in itself is a major issue for the 
development of Australian privacy related jurisprudence.  
  
Australia does not enjoy a significant body of judicial law concerning either privacy 
regulation at large, or more succinctly, the interpretation of the terms and principles used in 
the Privacy Act and the various state and territory instruments. There are several reasons for 
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this, in addition to the relative youth and limited size of the Commonwealth. The first is the 
impact which Victoria Park Racing113 had on the evolution of privacy based litigation in 
Australia. For a common law nation, the very clear statement of the majority in Victoria Park 
Racing had a stifling effect on the trial courts for more than 60 years.114 Furthermore, even 
following the implementation of the recommendations contained in ALRC 22, there has not 
since developed a large and instructive body of judicial decisions or administrative 
determinations which inform the operation of personal privacy protection in Australia. The 
main reason for this appear to be that the Privacy Act is limited in its scope, has too many 
exclusions and exceptions and does not create an enforceable regime for remedies or 
redress.115
 
 Moreover, the regulatory obligations of the Privacy Act have consistently been 
overseen by Privacy Commissioners who have taken the intentional approach of not reporting 
determinations.  
Accordingly, only a few reported decisions have considered the scope and operation of 
personal information as it is defined in the Privacy Act or the alternative state based 
legislation. However, some cases in which definitions of personal information have been 
decided indicate that there is a lack of a conceptual base for assessing what is personal 
information. It then becomes apparent that the lack of cohesion regarding the conceptual basis 
of personal information leads to different judicial decision making about what constitutes 
personal information.  
 
In Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance (MEAA)116 Gyles 
J was required to determine whether an internal telephone directory of staff employed by 
Network Seven, illegally provided to the MEAA and a polling contractor, was personal 
information within the meaning of section 6 of the Privacy Act. His Honour held that, to know 
where and for which organisation a person works and the work telephone number of that 
person is personal within the statutory test but did not give any indication as to how he came 
to this decision.117 Likewise, the Victorian case of C Cockerill & Sons (Vic) Pty Ltd v The 
County Court of Victoria118
                                                     
113 Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479 
 involved a prosecution against the plaintiff for operating over-
weight trucks. The weighbridge tickets sought to be relied on by the State contained personal 
information about an individual, namely the driver of the vehicle, whose identity was 
apparent from those documents. In particular, it was alleged that the relevant information 
‘about’ the individual contained in the weighbridge tickets was that the individual was the 
driver of the vehicle. The plaintiff attempted to exclude the evidence contained in the 
weighbridge tickets on the basis that it had been illegally obtained, contrary to the provisions 
114 Damages awarded for breach of privacy are traditionally modest (absent actual loss) which means that such 
cases are commenced in the lower courts.  Magistrates and Inferior Court Judges were unlikely or unable to 
challenge High Court precedent in an emerging area of the law and it is reasonable to infer that advice to this 
effect was given in solicitor’s offices on many occasions. 
115 Section 52(1B) Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).  See also Day v Lynn [2003] FCA 879 per Stone J at [50]. 
116 [2004] FCA 637. 
117 [2004] FCA 637, para. 45. “In my opinion the information is ‘personal’ in the statutory sense. To know where 
and for which organisation a person works and the work telephone number of the person is ‘personal’ as 
required.” 
118 [2007] VSC 182. 
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of the Privacy Act.  Ultimately the issue on appeal turned on an exercise by the court of its 
discretion to accept the evidence, which the court rejected.119
 
  
On a similar basis, the courts have accepted that an individual’s name and residential address 
fall within section 6(1) of the Privacy Act but again have provided no indication why this is 
so. In Le and Secretary, Department of Education, Science and Training120
 
 a complaint was 
made about the extent of information contained in a decision reported by the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal (the “AAT”) that concerned the applicant. The case involved an application 
for review by the applicant regarding a decision of the Student Assistance Review Tribunal 
(the “SART”). The AAT found that the reasons delivered by the SART revealed the plaintiffs 
personal information. In this case such information included the applicant’s name, the address 
of the applicant and his parents, the names of the tertiary institutions he attended and the 
witnesses who gave evidence.   
The decision in SW v Forests NSW121 concerned a resolution to terminate the applicant’s 
employment based on information conveyed to the employer by the New South Wales Fire 
Brigades (the “NSWFB”) which suggested that while on sick leave, the applicant had been 
performing duties as a part-time fire fighter. The applicant complained that the conduct of the 
NSWFB in providing information to the employer constituted a breach of the privacy 
principles contained in the PPIPA.  In its decision on internal review NSWFB asserted that 
the subject disclosures did not involve personal information. They were described as 
information about the work activities of people listed in the occurrence book also references 
to name information in the occurrence book, including full and partial names, initial and 
addresses.  These arguments were rejected by the Administrative Decisions Tribunal which 
held that the photographs were personal information but did not give reasons for this 
decision.122
 
  
None of the Australian decisions discussed in this paper and published post 2004, addressed 
the findings in the Booth Report when considering the practical, contextual operation of 
personal information. The examples highlighted above, such as Le123 and SW do not posit the 
application of any conceptual rationalisation. Instead these cases of context independent 
association seem to be resolved on intuitive terms.124
                                                     
119 Mandie J sitting in the Common Law Division of the Supreme Court of Victoria stated “It seems to me to be 
curious and somewhat far-reaching that such a reference (arguably incidental) to an individual in a commercial 
document or record should constitute personal information for the purposes of protection under privacy 
principles. However, like the Judge, I find it unnecessary to decide whether personal information is involved 
and, in what follows, I will assume that it is.” 
 The judgments reveal an instinctive 
approach to the classification of personal information without recourse to an underlying 
conceptual base. These decisions therefore appear to favour a context independent approach 
as personal information is information that has been classified without recourse to the social 
context in question. However, other judgments have specifically addressed the conceptual 
120 [2006] AATA 208. 
121 [2006] NSWADT 74. 
122 [2006] NSWADT 74, para. 31 “There is no dispute that the four digital photographs of SW taken by an 
officer of Forests NSW, stored electronically in his office computer, copied (downloaded) on to a number of 
compact discs and distributed to a number of people, are personal information about SW, as defined in s 4 of the 
PPIP Act.” 
123 [45] and [46].  
124 For example in SW, the relevant reasons proceeded on the following basis: “The second argument is simply 
unsustainable on the facts.  The email referred to the applicant by reference to his full first name and his 
surname.” 
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reach of personal information and have re-emphasised that context must be taken into account 
upon decisions relating to the classification of personal information.  
 
For example, the determination in WL v Randwick City Council125 involved an allegation that 
photographs taken of a residential apartment were personal information within the meaning of 
the PPIPA. The applicant owned a unit in a strata plan that was the subject of a complaint to 
the Council by a neighbour concerned that work was being carried out on the unit without a 
development approval. A Council officer attended the unit and was allowed entry by a person 
in occupation of the unit and carrying out work. The Council officer took external and internal 
photographs of the unit for the purpose of an investigation under the Environmental Planning 
and Assessment Act 1979 (the “EPA Act”). The Council forwarded a copy of the photographs 
to the solicitor for the Strata Managers and a copy of a Notice made under the EPA Act (the 
“EPA Notice”) to the Strata Managers.  The applicant complained that the council breached 
his privacy by entering his unit, taking photographs, forwarding the photographs to the 
solicitor and the EPA Notice to the Strata Managers.  He argued that the photographs could 
easily identify him to the Strata Managers, however the Tribunal disagreed and held that the 
photographs did not identify the plaintiff or contain information that would have made his 
identity apparent or from which it could be reasonably ascertained.126 The Tribunal also 
decided that the Plaintiff’s name and address also did not constitute personal information and 
further stated that it was a “a question of fact in every case as to whether or not the name or 
address of a person amounts to ‘personal information’.”127
 
  
This decision provides an interesting example of the application of a context dependant 
identifier model, although the Tribunal was less motivated to protect privacy interests, 
presumably due to the nature of the informational context. It nonetheless found that it was a 
‘question of fact in every case as to whether or not the name or address of a person amounts 
to personal information’ and that in the circumstances of this case, the photographs did not 
identify any individuals or contain information about an individual whose identity was 
apparent. It appears that this determination was reached without specific reference to the 
applicant’s submission that his identity would be apparent to any member of the body 
corporate who was shown the photographs.   
 
The case was heard on appeal by the President of the Tribunal, DCJ O’Connor who roundly 
criticised the Tribunal’s judgment because the analysis of what constitutes personal 
information was based on an interpretation of ‘personal affairs’ found in freedom of 
information legislation.128 The President reaffirmed that a “broad, unrestricted definition 
primary definition of personal information” was a standard feature of privacy protection 
statutes and must be interpreted broadly.129 Moreover, the court found that that it would be 
rare for a name not to be considered personal information as it is “generally regarded as the 
primary form of identification for a person.”130
  
 
The issue of context based analysis was dealt with directly by the President O’Connor in Y v 
Director General, Department of Education and Training.131
                                                     
125 
 The case involved four 
[2007] NSWADT 12. 
126 [2007] NSWADT 12, para. 34. 
127 [2007] NSWADT 12, para. 35. 
128 [2007] NSWADTAP 58, para. 20. 
129 [2007] NSWADTAP 58, para. 22. 
130 [2007] NSWADTAP 58, para. 21. 
131 [2001] NSWADT 149. 
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documents produced by a management review team pertaining to a review of a school at 
which the applicant was employed. The documents made certain allegations about the 
applicant which were disclosed at a public meeting. The issue of whether the documents 
contained personal information was not contested but the respondent sought to rely on section 
4(3)(j) of PIPPA which provides an exclusion for personal information that relates to an 
individual’s suitability for appointment or employment as a public sector official.132
 
 The key 
issue of the case therefore regarded whether the information collected by the management 
review team was about the applicant’s suitability for appointment or employment at the 
school. President O’Connor stated that the test to determine this issue was as follows:  
The test, as I see it, must in each case be whether having regard to the content of the 
information in issue and the context in which it is found it can reasonably be said to 
be ‘about an individual’s suitability for appointment or employment. 
 
The judgment clearly acknowledges the requirement for a context based analysis to determine 
the scope of the exclusion under section 4(3)(j) of PIPPA. The subsequent case of PN v 
Department of Education and Training133 also examined the same exclusion in a case that 
involved the disclosure of medical and complaint information which was disclosed without 
authorisation. The judgment applied the above test134 which was accepted by both parties but 
also went further in relation to the adoption of a purposive approach to interpretation that is in 
keeping with the notion of PIPPA as a piece of beneficial legislation.135 The judge also 
confirmed that had the same information been applied in a different context that regarded the 
applicant’s suitability for employment then he would have been minded to exclude the 
information under section 4(3)(j). However, a more rigid approach has been adopted to 
exclusions under 4(3)(b) that involve personal information published in publicly available 
documents. In EG v Commissioner of Police NSW136 the Tribunal held that whether personal 
information was exempt because it was publicly available had to be interpreted “according to 
its plain and ordinary meaning” and the fact that “information or an opinion may have a 
different significance depending on context does not provide a legal basis for concluding that 
the exception...does not apply.”137
 
 This determination therefore has the effect of limiting the 
degree of context based analysis with regard to section 4(3)(b). 
Two other cases have also set boundaries to interpretation of context based analysis regarding 
the classification of personal information. In Macquarie University v FM,138
                                                     
132 The exemption states “information or an opinion about an individual’s suitability for appointment or 
employment as a public sector official.” 
 the respondent 
was a doctoral student at Macquarie University. His enrolment was terminated for 
disciplinary reasons. Subsequently, he sought to become a doctoral student at the University 
of New South Wales (the “UNSW”). The latter University made enquiries of Macquarie 
University concerning the circumstances of the termination of the respondent’s candidature. 
Information was supplied in two telephone conversations. In both conversations, a person 
from Macquarie related to a person at UNSW their observations of incidents that lead to 
complaints being made against the respondent, and information they had been told about other 
incidents. Initially the complaint was upheld by the Administrative Decisions Tribunal, 
133 [2006] NSWADT 122. 
134 See also GL v Director-General, Department of Education and Training [2003] NSWADT 166 which also 
involves a case with the same exclusion. 
135 [2006] NSWADT 122, para. 57-58. 
136 [2003] NSWADT 150. 
137 [2003] NSWADT 150, para. 25. 
138 [2005] NSWCA 192. 
 26 
although the university successfully appealed to New South Wales Court of Appeal which 
held that information provided to UNSW, being information held in the minds of employees, 
was not of a kind to which the Privacy Act applied because it was not personal information 
held by Macquarie University.139
 
 Macquarie has a limiting effect on information context 
because it reduces the scope of information to be considered as part of a context based 
analysis that is encapsulated in hard copy form.  
In the Victorian case of WL v La Trobe University140 the complainant’s partner was 
interviewed as part of a social survey conducted on behalf of the respondents. The applicant’s 
telephone number was used as a contact point and a number of personal questions were asked 
about the applicant without her knowledge or consent. Moreover, as the applicant was 
concerned that she could be re-identified from de-identified data as she was both the home 
owner and the telephone number was in her name. The central issue of the case was whether 
the information provided was personal information which required adjudication about the 
applicant’s identity was either apparent or reasonably ascertainable under section 3 of the 
Victorian Information Privacy Act. The Tribunal held that the applicant’s identity was not 
apparent because there was nothing in the information collected that would enable the 
applicant’s identity to be apparent.141
 
  
Of more interest to this article, was the Tribunal’s decision regarding the reasonably 
ascertainable element as it set the bounds of what would be reasonably ascertainable as 
regards steps to re-identify the applicant. The process for doing so would involve cross-
matching of various internal databases with an external database and the completion of this 
process could still not guarantee re-identification of the applicant.142 Accordingly, the 
applicant’s identity was not reasonably ascertainable and the information was not deemed to 
be personal information. The Tribunal did confirm that the process of reasonably ascertaining 
an individual’s identity was context based and required “some resort to extraneous 
material.”143 However, the reasonableness element of the legislation bounds the process of 
ascertainment because it constrains the range of information that can be include as part of an 
analysis of additional materials.144 In that sense, the definition of personal information was 
developed in the Victorian legislation “in the interest of supporting a nationally consistent 
approach to the protection of privacy.”145
 
 
It is at this point that we square the circle between the inconsistent approaches adopted at both 
legislative and judicial levels regarding the classification of personal information. The 
application of the Booth Report models to Australian privacy laws demonstrates that different 
laws have varying degrees of application regarding a context based approach to the 
classification of personal information. A similar situation is apparent from a review of the 
relevant case law as personal information has been classified in three ways, from an:  
 
• Intuitive perspective that favours context independence; 146
                                                     
139 See also OD v Department of Education [2006] NSWADT 312. 
  
140 [2005] VCAT 2592. 
141 [2005] VCAT 2592, para. 19. 
142 [2005] VCAT 2592, para. 42. 
143 [2005] VCAT 2592, para. 45. 
144 [2005] VCAT 2592, para. 52. 
145 [2005] VCAT 2592, para. 53. 
146 See e.g. Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance (MEAA) [2004] FCA 637; 
C Cockerill & Sons (Vic) Pty Ltd v The County Court of Victoria [2007] VSC 182; Le and Secretary, 
Department of Education, Science and Training [2006] AATA 208; SW v Forests NSW [2006] NSWADT 74. 
 27 
• Expansive perspective that favours a greater context dependent approach;147
• Constraining perspective that acknowledges the importance of a context dependent 
approach but seeks to bound it within a manageable framework predicated on 
reasonableness.
 and  
148
 
  
The issue of context dependent judgments relating to the classification of personal 
information are a fundamental part of Australian privacy laws and will increase in complexity 
as different technologies develop and different situations arise. Much could therefore be 
gained from having a coherent conceptual base for the classification of personal information 
at the heart of both legislative and judicial development. The models put forward by the 
Booth Report provide a framework that could formally link the disparate, inconsistent and 
sporadic development of Australian privacy legislation and case law relating the classification 
of personal information. However, this will require a wider ranging jurisprudence and the 
greater involvement of the courts in privacy related actions. Whether this materialises remains 
to be seen but a wider jurisprudential discourse based on a coherent theoretical framework 
could enhance awareness of the conceptual role of classification and could greatly assist the 
consistent development of Australian privacy laws and the intricate balance of context 
dependent and independent classificatory analysis of what information constitutes personal 
information.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Australian privacy laws have adopted a range of different definitions of personal information. 
Nevertheless, as highlighted by the application of the Booth models, the underlying 
conceptual focus of defining personal information in Australian privacy laws regards the 
revealment of identity as the social harm to be protected and the acknowledgment that social 
context plays an important role in classifications of personal information. However, the 
degree to which a context dependent or context independent approach exists varies within 
different categories of definitions of personal information. The extent to which this has been 
problematic has not sufficiently been addressed because one of the integral issues of 
Australian privacy law, the question of what is personal information, has thus far not been 
examined in depth due the unsatisfactory lack of information privacy related jurisprudence. 
This article contends that the conceptual models developed by the authors of the Booth Report 
could provide a foundation for future legislative and juridical decisions regarding the 
classification and scope of personal information in Australian privacy laws. Whilst this would 
require some fundamental changes to the direction of Australian privacy law one thing seems 
certain – rapid technological advances are likely to grow at ever increasing rates which will 
ultimately have an effect of what does and does not constitute personal information. The 
process of deciding what personal information is will therefore become more complex and 
will in turn require more complex conceptual models of classification.  
 
                                                     
147 See e.g. WL v Randwick City Council [2007] NSWADTAP 58; Y v Director General, Department of 
Education and Training [2001] NSWADT 149; PN v Department of Education and Training. 
148 See e.g. EG v Commissioner of Police NSW [2003] NSWADT 150; Macquarie University v FM [2005] 
NSWCA 192; WL v La Trobe University [2005] VCAT 2592. 
